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Abstract 
 
The article examines the impact of the reclassification of IAS 39 on income smoothing using 
loan loss provisions among European banks. The author predicts that the strict recognition and 
re-classification requirements of IAS 139 reduced banks' ability to smooth income using bank 
securities and derivatives, motivating them to rely more on loan loss provisions to smooth 
income. The findings do not support the prediction for income smoothing through loan loss 
provisions. Also, there is no evidence for income smoothing in the pre- and post-IAS 39 
reclassification period. The implication of the findings is that: (i) European banks did not use 
loan loss provisions to smooth income during the period examined, and rather rely on other 
accounting numbers to smooth income; (ii) the IASB’s strict disclosure regulation improved 
the reliability and informativeness of loan loss provision estimates among European banks 
during the period of analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
I examine the impact of IAS 39 reclassification on banks’ ability to use loan loss provisions to 
smooth income. I investigate whether the IAS 39 disclosure regulation that discourage the use 
of securities gains and loss to manage earnings motivated bank managers to switch to, or rely 
on, loan loss provisions to smooth income, as an alternative strategy to manage banks’ reported 
earnings.  
Income smoothing is the process of reporting stable profit over time (Ozili and Thankom, 2018; 
Ozili and Outa, 2017). Loan loss provisions is considered to be a major income smoothing tool 
because loan loss provisions are accrual estimates which are generated at managers’ discretion, 
thereby making loan loss provisions a useful tool in the hands of managers to alter accounting 
numbers to achieve some desired profit outcomes (Ozili and Outa, 2017). Some studies argue 
that bank managers, for various reasons, rely on the manipulation of loan loss provisions 
estimates to smooth income by overstating loan loss provisions estimates if reported earnings 
are expected to be too high and understating loan loss provisions estimates if reported earnings 
are expected to be too low so that reported earnings are never too high or too low 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2003, 2004; Liu and Ryan, 2006; Ozili and Outa, 2017). Managerial 
discretion in provisioning for income smoothing purpose can be restricted by strict accounting 
standards. To date, the literature is silent on the question of whether European banks prefer to 
use of loan loss provisions when new disclosure regulation such as IAS 39 discourage the use 
of bank securities to manage or smooth earnings. 
IAS 39 had undergone several revisions to date.1 IAS 39 issued in 2004 require a financial 
institution to measure financial assets or liabilities at fair value through the profit or loss 
statement. After the 2008 financial crisis, the 2008-2009 amendment to IAS 39 changed the 
accounting for financial instruments substantially by (i) permitting the re-classification of 
securities out of the trading category only in rare circumstances; (ii) permitting the re-
classification to loan category (cost basis) if the firm has an intention and ability to hold the 
securities for the foreseeable future (loans) or until maturity (debt securities); and (iii) not 
permitting the re-classification of securities if fair value is the option previously elected.  
For the purpose of measurement, IAS 39 paragraph 50 states that an entity “(i) shall not re-
classify a derivative financial instrument into or out of the fair value through profit or loss 
category while it is held or issued; (ii) shall not re-classify any financial instrument out of the 
fair value through profit or loss category if upon initial recognition it was designated by the 
entity as at fair value through profit or loss; and may do so if (iii) a financial asset is no longer 
held for the purpose of selling or repurchasing it in the near term (notwithstanding that the 
financial asset may have been acquired or incurred principally for the purpose of selling or 
                                                          
1
 IAS 39 Accounting for Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement was issued in 2004 and became 
effective from 1st January, 2005. In March 2004, IAS 39 was revised to reflect macro hedging. In 2006, IAS 39 
was amended to include fair value option for measuring securities. In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the 
IASB amended IAS 39 because of its impact on bank balance sheet during the crisis. Subsequent amendments to 
IAS 39 for embedded derivatives on reclassifications of financial assets was made in March 2009 effective from 
July 2009, and further improvement to IAS 39 annual reporting was made in April 2009. The aim of IAS 39 was 
to improve disclosure and transparency of transactions involving securities. Although the earliest sample period 
for this study is 2005 (the time when IAS 39 became effective), this starting period of analysis allows us to 
focus on the changes occurring around the re-classification of IAS 39 before and after 2009. 
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repurchasing it in the near term), reclassify that financial asset out of the fair value through 
profit or loss category.” (IASB, 2008: p.3-4).  
The intent of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in issuing IAS 39 was to 
increase the transparency of transactions involving securities and derivatives and to ensure the 
timely recognition/reporting of the associated gains and losses on these instruments. 
Subsequent revisions to re-classified IAS 39 was intended to further improve the recognition 
of financial instruments and to limit managers’ ability to manipulate or smooth income using 
securities and derivatives.  
In this paper, I argue that European banks that were affected by IAS 39 will rely more on loan 
loss provisions to smooth income rather than rely on realised/unrealised securities gains to 
smooth income, because the stricter recognition and re-classification requirements of IAS 39 
will reduce banks' ability to smooth income using realised/unrealised gains from bank 
securities and derivatives. I find that listed European banks do not use loan loss provisions to 
smooth reported earnings during the period examined. Also, I did not find any significant 
difference in the income smoothing behaviour of banks and non-bank financial institutions in 
Europe.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature in the following ways. First, I extend 
the frontiers of earnings management research to banks. I provide insights on whether banks 
revert to accrual earnings management when strict regulation discourage real-earnings 
management behaviour. Prior literature has focus extensively on non-financial institutions 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al, 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). I focus on banks, 
thereby, contributing to the bank earnings management literature (e.g. Barth et al, 2017; Ozili 
and Outa, 2018a; Ozili, 2017, etc.). The insight from the findings suggest that banks do not 
necessarily revert to accrual earnings management when disclosure regulation discourages 
real-earnings management behaviour. Secondly, this study contributes to the financial 
reporting quality literature. Prior studies in this literature assess the effectiveness of IFRS in 
improving the transparency and accounting quality of financial reporting (Penman, 2007; 
Garrett et al, 2014). I focus on bank financial reporting, and provide insights for the impact of 
IAS 39 re-classification on banks’ propensity to use loan loss provisions to smooth reported 
earnings, a context that remain unexplored by prior literature. And finally, I respond to calls 
for more contextually-embedded examinations of the impact of disclosure regulation on bank 
financial reporting (DeFond, 2010; Outa et al, 2017). Focusing on European banks, I provide 
insights on the strength of disclosure regulation, whether strict or weak, depending on its ability 
to constrain managers from engaging in earnings management behaviour. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. I discuss institutional background, literature 
review and hypothesis development in Section 2. Section 3 presents the research design. 
Section 4 presents the data and sample selection. Section 5 discusses the findings and Section 
6 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
     P. K. Ozili 
4 
 
2. Conceptual Framework and Related Literature 
2.1 Bank Securities 
The accounting for financial assets and derivatives in Europe is specified in IASB’s 
International accounting standard (IAS) 39. IAS 39 paragraph 9 require all entities, including 
banks, to categorise securities into one of four categories: financial assets at fair value through 
profit or loss; held-to-maturity investments; loans and receivables; and available-for-sale 
financial assets.2 Changes in the fair value of bank securities, i.e. trading and AFS securities, 
yield realised/unrealized gains and losses that are recognized in earnings and bank capital. 
Managerial discretion in the timing of the recognition of realized/unrealized gains or losses on 
bank securities provide incentives for bank managers to manage reported earnings and to 
manage regulatory capital. Also, because the sale of securities involves transaction costs and 
such sales are not subject to ex-post scrutiny by external auditors, banks consider sale of 
securities to be a less costly technique to manage earnings to avoid the cost associated with 
accrual-based earnings management techniques (Barth et al, 2017). 
Securitization by banks constitute a large component of total securitization in the financial 
system (Niu and Richardson 2005). The use of gains and losses on bank securities to manage 
earnings is a real earnings management technique among banks. Real earnings management 
(REM) is any practice that is a “departure from normal operational practices, motivated by 
managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting 
goals have been met in the normal course of operations” (Roychowdhury, 2006: 337). Some 
studies that investigated industrial firms show that in periods of strict regulation, firms revert 
to real earnings management techniques to manage earnings rather than accrual-based earnings 
management techniques (see. Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al, 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010), but this technique reversal has not been tested for banks.3 Kotari et al (2012) suggest 
that the motivation to switch from accrual to real earnings management is because it is difficult 
for stakeholders to see through real earnings management compared to accrual earnings 
management because real earnings management camouflage as normal operating activities.  
Notwithstanding, this argument has not been empirically tested for banks, extensively.4 In fact, 
DeFond (2010) and Barth et al (2017) confirms that real earnings management research in 
banks is scant in the literature. Dechow et al. (2010) investigate the use of securitization gains 
to influence earnings. They find that securitization gains are used to manage earnings, but firms 
with independent boards have less income smoothing practices. Beatty et al. (2002) find that 
public banks use their discretion in the recognition of securities gain and loss to achieve 
earnings targets relative to private banks. Barth et al (2017) investigate the use of available-
for-sale securities (AFS) to manage earnings and regulatory capital, and they find that both 
listed and non-listed banks use AFS securities gains and losses to smooth earnings and 
                                                          
2
 Financial assets or trading securities are securities that the bank will sell or dispose in the near term. Trading 
securities are measured at their fair values while held-to-maturity (HTM) securities are debt securities that banks 
intend to hold to maturity. HTM securities are measured at amortised cost. Loans and receivables are measured 
at amortised cost. Available-for-sale financial assets are securities that are not categorised as trading securities 
or held-to maturity securities. AFS securities are measured at fair values. 
3
 Specifically, Cohen et al (2008) find that firms shifted from accrual to real earnings management in the post- 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act period to avoid detection and regulatory scrutiny from regulators or external auditors. 
4
 This is because most studies exclude banks and financial institutions in their analysis because banks are 
considered to be heavily regulated and such regulations will limit managerial discretion in managing earnings 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997) 
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regulatory capital, and the extent of income smoothing and capital management is greater for 
banks with accumulated realized gains and losses. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
2.2.1. Earnings Management 
Bank earnings Management literature has two dimensions. Firstly, one can examine real 
earnings management which often disguise as normal operations; secondly, one can examine 
accrual earning management which exploits the timing and/or size of expected revenue/income 
or estimated costs/expenses to manipulate reported profit. Using accrual earnings management, 
for instance, banks can use accruals to generate smoother earnings in order to reduce 
information asymmetry between managers and outside investors and to avoid regulatory 
scrutiny from regulators (Beatty et al. 2002; Liu and Ryan 2006). Banks can underestimate 
loan loss provisions estimates to boost earnings; they can accelerate future fee income to the 
present period to boost earnings, they can dispose fixed assets to boost earnings, etc (e.g., 
Schrand and Wong 2003; Kanagaretnam et al. 2004; Liu and Ryan 2006). Also, banks with 
low capital ratios can increase their capital ratios through accruals (e.g., loan loss provisions, 
fee income, defer loss write-offs, interest income, etc,) or through real activities (e.g., security 
gains or losses, sale of fixed assets, etc.,) in order to avoid regulatory scrutiny intervention 
(Moyer 1990; Beatty et al. 1995; Ahmed et al. 1999). Furthermore, in periods of strict 
regulation, banks can revert to real earnings management techniques to manage earnings using 
securitisation rather than accrual-based earnings management techniques. Kothari et al (2012) 
explained that the motivation to switch from accrual to real earnings management is because it 
is difficult for stakeholders to see through real earnings management compared to accrual 
earnings management because real earnings management disguise as normal.  
Banks can use securitization gains or losses for income smoothing or earnings management 
purposes, depending on their opportunity. For instance, Beatty et al. (2002) find that public 
banks use their discretion in the recognition of securities gain and loss to achieve earnings 
targets relative to private banks, while Barth et al (2017) find that both listed and non-listed 
banks realize gains and losses on AFS securities to smooth earnings and to manage regulatory 
capital, and the extent of income smoothing and capital management is greater for banks with 
accumulated realized gains and losses.  
Fair value accounting can also create opportunities for earnings management. Fair-value 
accounting involves reporting assets and liabilities on the balance sheet at fair value and 
recognizing changes in fair value as on the balance sheet as gains and losses in the income 
statement (Laux and Leuz, 2010). Managers can manipulate the disclosure of fair value 
measurements (Song et al. 2010). By adopting the fair value option, firms with weak corporate 
governance can disclose more fair-valued liabilities and recognize unrealized gains into 
reported earnings to meet or beat analyst forecast target. (Hsu and Lin, 2016). Generally, the 
literature shows strong evidence for bank income smoothing using loan loss provisions rather 
than securities. 
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2.2.2. Loan Loss Provisions 
Empirical evidence for bank income smoothing using loan loss provision is extensive in the 
literature (Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; El Sood, 
2012; Leventis et al, 2011; Ozili and Outa, 2017: Ozili and Thankom, 2018; Balbao et al, 2013). 
For instance, Leventis et al (2011) investigate the impact of accounting disclosure (IFRS) on 
managerial incentives to smooth income and to manage capital using loan loss provisions. In 
their study, they note that some banks adopted IFRS earlier than other banks and argue that 
early-adopter banks may have different incentives for adopting IFRS compared to late-adopter 
banks. They examine 91 EU listed commercial banks for the 1999 to 2008 period, and find 
evidence for income smoothing among early and late adopter. They further divide the sample 
into risky and non-risky banks and find that risky banks engage in aggressive income 
smoothing compared to less risky banks. Overall, they observe that income smoothing is 
reduced after mandatory implementation of IFRS, and conclude that IFRS improves the 
earnings quality of European banks. 
Ashraf et al (2013) investigate whether changes in accounting standards and prudential 
regulatory regime affects the use of loan loss provisions to manage earnings. They examine 
7343 banks from 118 countries from 1999 to 2010. They find that bank managers use loan loss 
provisions as a tool to smooth reported earnings. However, they find weak evidence supporting 
a differential impact on earnings management via loan loss provisions following a change in 
accounting regime. Moreover, they observe that banks under a principles-based accounting 
regime are more likely to exhibit lower level of earnings management via loan loss provisions 
when compared to banks under a rule-based accounting regime. Also, Ozili and Outa (2018b) 
examine bank earnings smoothing during mandatory IFRS adoption in Nigeria, and observe 
that IFRS reduced income smoothing using loan loss provisions both for listed and unlisted 
banks, implying that disclosure regulation improves the informativeness and reliability of loan 
loss provisions estimate. 
Kilic et al (2012) examine the impact of SFAS 133 on the reporting behaviour of commercial 
banks. SFAS 133 is the FASB’s accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities. 
They argue that, because the strict recognition and classification requirements of SFAS 133 
reduced banks' ability to smooth income through securities/derivatives, banks that were 
affected by SFAS 133 would rely more on loan loss provisions to smooth income. They 
examine 119 US banks and divided their sample into pre-SFAS 133 period (1999-2000) and 
post-SFAS 133 period (2001-2002). Their explanation for the choice of the narrow sample 
period was to capture the changes occurring around the enactment of SFAS 133 and to avoid 
possible contamination from other events. They find evidence that US banks use loan loss 
provisions to smooth income when disclosure regulation made it difficult to smooth income 
using securities/derivatives. Although their result supports their argument, they also note that 
the implication of income smoothing via loan loss provisions imply declining informativeness 
of loan loss provisions estimates. 
Overall, the effect of disclosure regulation on bank income smoothing via loan loss provisions 
depends on the extent of enforcement and supervision, and whether disclosure regulation 
directly limits the use of certain accounting numbers to smooth income such as derivatives or 
loan loss provisions. The focus in this study is on loan loss provisions. To date, the literature 
is silent on the question of whether European banks shift to the use of loan loss provisions 
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when disclosure regulation disallows the use of bank securities to manage reported earnings. 
therefore, the hypothesis is derived from Kilic et al (2012) and predict that: 
H1: European banks will rely on the use of loan loss provisions to smooth income in the post-
IAS 39 reclassification period.  
The prediction is that the disclosure regulation that discourage banks from using securities to 
manage earnings will motivate banks to use loan loss provisions more aggressively to smooth 
income. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between loan loss provisions and earnings 
in the post-IAS 39 reclassification period – the period where strict restrictions were place on 
bank securitization activities. In H1, I propose that banks will revert from real activity-based 
to accrual-based earnings management (i.e., loan loss provisions) to smooth earnings if bank 
managers believe that external auditors cannot see through provisions-based earnings 
management.  
 
3. Research Design 
The model employed to test the income smoothing hypothesis is a modified form of the models 
used in prior studies (such as El Sood, 2012; Leventis et al, 2011; Balbao et al, 2013, Ashraf et 
al, 2013; Kilic et al, 2012; Ozili and Thankom, 2018, etc).  
To test the income smoothing hypothesis, I estimate the equation below: 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛼2𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛼4𝐼𝐴𝑆𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐼𝐴𝑆∗ 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛼7𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝛼8𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 +  𝛼9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑏𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝑐𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝑒𝑖, 𝑡. (1) 
Where, 
i = bank 
t = year 
LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets 
NPL= ratio of impaired loans to outstanding gross loans 
LOAN = change in outstanding gross loan. 
CAR = ratio of actual Tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 
EBTP = ratio of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to total assets 
IAS = dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the post-IAS 39 reclassification period and 
zero otherwise. 
IAS*EBTP = the interaction of IAS with EBTP reflects whether income smoothing is more 
pronounced in the post-IAS 39 reclassification period. 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
ΔGDP = change in real gross domestic product 
e = error term 
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The variable of interest is IAS*EBTP, which reflects whether income smoothing is more 
pronounced during the post-IAS 39 reclassification period. A positive sign is expected for the 
α5 coefficient if banks use loan loss provisions to smooth income during the period when re-
classified IAS 39 rules discourage the use of bank securities/derivatives to smooth income.  
At bank level, the non-performing loan (NPL) variable control for non-discretionary factors 
affecting the provisioning decisions of banks. Beaver and Engel (1996) and Ahmed et al (1999) 
also use NPL as a non-discretionary determinant of bank provisions in their study. NPL is an 
ex-post measure of loan portfolio quality, and contains information on bank risk that is not 
captured by traditional measures of bank risk (Ozili, 2019). I predict a positive sign for NPL 
coefficient because banks will increase loan loss provisions when they expect higher problem 
loans. Loan growth (LOAN) is a measure of credit risk and also influence bank provisioning 
decisions (Lobo and Yang, 2001; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Kanagaretnam et al, 2003; 
Bushman and Williams, 2012). I do not have a definite prediction for the sign of LOAN 
coefficient because a positive sign may imply that banks that increase lending would increase 
provisions when there is substantial credit risk in the lending environment while a negative 
sign may imply that banks that increase lending would report fewer provisions when there is 
little or no credit risk in the lending environment. The CAR variable controls for capital 
management. Banks can increase provisions when they have low regulatory capital ratios in 
order to compensate for their lower regulatory capital levels, and vice versa (Anandarajan et 
al, 2007; Beatty et al, 1995; Ozili and Outa, 2017), thus, I expect a negative sign for CAR 
coefficient. Next, I introduce the ‘IAS’ dummy variable to capture IASB’s change in disclosure 
regulation following IAS 39 reclassification of bank securities into available for sale securities, 
held-to-maturity securities, and trading securities in 2009. The IAS variable takes the value 1 
for the post-reclassified IAS 39 period and zero otherwise. At country level, I use ΔGDP 
variable to control for economic fluctuations for each country because banks would generally 
increase provisions during bad economic times to mitigate credit risk arising from loan defaults 
during such periods, and will keep fewer provisions during good economic times because loan 
defaults are generally lower during good times, therefore, I predict a negative sign for ΔGDP 
coefficient indicating procyclical provisioning behaviour. 
 
4. Data 
The population is the European banking institutions in the Bankscope database.5 I restricted 
the sample period to annual bank data, and all banks in the sample have December 31 fiscal 
year ends. The sample period covers the 2005 to 2013 period. The restriction to the sample 
period is to focus on the changes occurring around the implementation of IAS 39 
reclassification during the 2008 and 2009 period and to avoid possible contamination from 
other events. I then divide the sample period into the pre-IAS 39 reclassification period (2005-
2007) and post- IAS 39 reclassification period (2009-2013). I included and later excluded year-
2008 bank-year observation from the model during the robustness checks to observe whether 
                                                          
5
 Bankscope database has the widest coverage of data for banking and banking-related financial institutions in 
the world. Bank holding companies directly or indirectly control one or more commercial banks. The bank 
holding company can be a single commercial bank which in turn controls one or more commercial banks 
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the financial crisis had any impact on the inferences. I obtain data for 200 banking institutions 
from 16 European countries6. Some banks in the database did not report data for some years, 
and I excluded banking institutions that did not report data on loan loss provisions for a 
sufficient period of time. However, because I did not want to lose any further observations 
which could reduce the validity of the inference, I included banking institutions with 
incomplete data for up to two consecutive years only. The final sample yields 114 sample banks 
that provide usable data for loan loss provisions and other crucial variables for a 9-year period. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the full sample, pre- and post-reclassified IAS 39 reclassification are 
presented in Table 1. The mean (median) value of LLPs in the pre-reclassified IAS 39 period 
is 0.18 (0.14) while the mean (median) value of LLPs in the post-reclassified IAS 39 period 
increases to 0.45 (0.29) indicating increased provisioning in the post-reclassified IAS 39 
period. The mean (median) value of Tier 1 capital over the minimum required capital (CAR) 
report a significant increase from 8.54 (8.09) in the pre-IAS period to 12.04 (11.18) in the post-
reclassified IAS 39 period. The mean value of EBTP decreased from 1.05 in the pre-reclassified 
1AS 39 period to 0.73 in the post-reclassified IAS39 period, implying lower profitability 
among European banking institutions. 
(Table 1) 
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients of the sample variables and their associated 
p-values. LLPs are negative but not significantly correlated to EBTP (-0.042) and bank size (-
0.029). This correlation result is insignificant to make any inference. On the other hand, LLPs 
are significant and negatively correlated CAR (-0.223) and ΔGDP (-0.387) implying that 
European bank appear to use provisions to manage regulatory capital and, also, provisioning is 
procyclical with fluctuations in the business cycle, respectively. LLPs are negatively correlated 
with LOAN (-0.106) indicating improved quality of incremental loans. LLPs are positively and 
significantly correlated with NPL (0.576), implying that as banks expect higher loan defaults, 
they will increase provisions. These results are consistent with prior studies. 
(Table 2) 
5.2. Regression Results 
Table 3 report the regression results. The variable of interest is the interaction term 
‘IAS*EBTP’. The coefficient of the interaction term ‘IAS*EBTP’ (t=-4.93) is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that European banks did not use loan loss provisions to 
smooth reported earnings in the post-reclassified IAS 39 period. This result is not consistent 
with the first hypothesis (H1), and suggest that European banks did not switch to the use of 
loan loss provisions to smooth income when disclosure regulation discouraged the use of 
securities gains and losses to smooth income. One possible explanation for this result could be 
that European banks are aware that external auditors and investor analysts can see through 
                                                          
6
 United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Austria, Italy, France, Luxemburg, 
Spain, Netherland, Germany, Sweden and Norway. 
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provisions-based income smoothing, therefore they refrained from using provisions to smooth 
income during the post-IAS 39 period. 
EBTP coefficient (t = -1.91) is negative and significant, implying that loan loss provisions are 
not used to smooth income over the period of analysis. One explanation for this result is that 
the stringent regulation and supervision of European banks, immediately after the global 
financial crisis, placed intense scrutiny on the financial reporting of European banks. Banks 
had very little opportunity to manipulate profit for income smoothing purposes due to intense 
scrutiny. The observed absence of income smoothing is consistent with Ahmed et al (1999) 
who also did not find evidence for income smoothing during the adoption of Basel capital rules, 
in their study. The finding is also consistent with Ozili and Outa (2018b) who find no evidence 
for income smoothing during mandatory IFRS adoption among listed and non-listed banks. 
Leventis et al (2011) examine income smoothing using early European bank data from 1996-
2008 and find no evidence for income smoothing, in contrast to Leventis et al (2011), the 
sample used in this study cover a more recent period from 2005 to 2013 and there is no evidence 
for income smoothing in the post-reclassified IAS 39 period.  
Although I find no evidence for income smoothing, this does not imply that European banks 
do not smooth income.  Rather, an explanation for this could be that European banks switch to 
use alternative accounting numbers, not captured in this study, to smooth or manage earnings 
during the period. 
In Table 3, most of the control variables report the predicted signs. As expected, ΔGDP 
coefficient (t = -8.13) is negative and statistically significant, indicating that provisioning in 
Europe is procyclical. CAR coefficient is negative and significant indicating that banks use 
provisions to capital management purpose. IAS coefficient is positive and significant, implying 
that reclassified IAS 39 had a positive impact on the level of loan loss provisions. LOAN and 
SIZE coefficients are not significant.  
(Table 3) 
5.2.1. Listed versus non-listed banks 
Next, I test whether listed banks smooth income for capital market reasons compared to non-
listed banks during in the post-reclassified IAS 39 period. Anandarajan et al (2007) argue that 
the manager of a listed bank has incentives to smooth earnings if he believes that smoothed 
earnings will translate to reduced fluctuation in stock prices. I divide the sample into two 
subsamples: listed and non-listed banks7. The result is reported in column A&B of Table 4. 
The IAS*EBTP coefficient is negative and insignificant for listed banks, and positive but 
insignificant for non-listed banks. The insignificant results suggest that European listed and 
non-listed banks did not use provisions to smooth income during the period. 
5.2.2. Bank versus non-bank financial institutions 
Further, I check whether the propensity to smooth income in the pre- and post-IAS 39 
reclassification period depends on the type of financial institutions – commercial and non-
                                                          
7
 I distinguish between listed and non-listed banks based on the list of companies provided available at the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) updated as at 30th April, 2015. I use the LSE as a proxy for the capital market 
because it is the most diverse capital market with regional company listing in Europe. The classification yields 
12 listed banks and 92 non-listed banks. I note that the small number of listed bank may affect the inferences. 
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commercial banks. The result is reported in column C&D of Table 4. The t-statistics for EBTP 
and IAS*EBTP coefficients are both negative and significant for banking institutions and non-
banking institutions except for IAS*EBTP which is positive but insignificant for banking 
institutions. This finding imply that banks do not use loan loss provisions to smooth income. 
(Table 4) 
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to verify the robustness of the results, I performed some sensitivity tests with respect 
to the sample period. Also, to avoid overstating the t-statistics commonly associated with time-
series cross section data, I include bank fixed effects. First, I rerun the main regression model 
after excluding 2008 bank-year observation to eliminate the effect of the 2008 financial crisis. 
The result is reported in Column A of Table 5. The EBTP coefficient remain negative but 
insignificant. Similarly, the IAS*EBTP coefficient remain negative and significant at one 
percent level. Additionally, I divided the entire sample into two sub-samples: pre-reclassified 
IAS 39 (2005-2007) and pre-reclassified IAS 39 (2009-2013). The model is re-specified to 
eliminate the IAS*EBTP interaction term and the IAS dummy variable. The resulting model 
specification is then given as: 
LLP = NPL + LOAN + EBTP + CAR + SIZE + ΔGDP + ε. (2) 
In equation 2, EBTP, the income smoothing variable, is the variable of interest. Table 5 Column 
(b) reports the subsample result for the pre-reclassified IAS 39 period, and EBTP coefficient is 
positive but not significant. Table 5 Column (c) reports the subsample result, EBTP coefficient 
is negative and strongly significant. This result is robust to the earlier conclusion that there is 
no evidence income smoothing via loan loss provision, indicated by the negative sign for EBTP 
coefficient.  
Further, because of concerns that the impact of the financial crisis may extend into year 2009 
bank reporting, I rerun Column (c) after excluding 2008 and 2009 bank-year observations. The 
results are reported in Column (d) and EBTP coefficient remains negatively significant. 
Overall, these results are robust to the earlier conclusion based on the estimation window of 
this study. Therefore, I conclude that the findings are robust with respect to the estimation 
window. 
(Table 5) 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study examined whether European banks use loan loss provisions to smooth income in 
the period when reclassified IAS 39 disclosure regulation discouraged banks from using 
securities/derivatives for income smoothing. I focused on loan loss provisions – a crucial 
accounting number that has gained the attention of both accounting standard setters and bank 
supervisors.  
I observe that European banks do not use loan loss provisions to smooth income in the post-
IAS 39 reclassification period due to strict regulation and to avoid scrutiny from external 
auditors. Also, I did not find evidence for income smoothing among European listed banks and 
unlisted banks which suggests that there were no capital market incentives to use loan loss 
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provisions to smooth income during the period of analyses. Similarly, I did not find evidence 
for income smoothing between banks and non-bank financial institutions in Europe. Overall, 
the results imply that European banks used other accounting numbers to smooth income rather 
than using loan loss provisions during the period. The findings are useful to accounting 
standard setters in their evaluation of the role of disclosure regulation in improving accounting 
quality in bank financial reporting, given the strict regulatory environment in Europe for banks.  
The implication for banking supervision is that European banks possibly use other accounting 
numbers to smooth income, not loan loss provisions. Depending on the desirability of income 
smoothing by bank regulators, regulators should monitor and understand the techniques used 
by banks to smooth income, and should understand the incentives for smoothing income among 
European banks. European bank regulators should ensure that the income smoothing incentives 
and techniques used by banks improves the stability of financial system.  
From an accounting standard setting standpoint, the findings that European banks do not use 
provisions to smooth income during the IAS 39 reclassification period implies that IAS 39 was 
successful in achieving the IASB’s goal of increasing the reliability and informativeness of 
financial disclosures in financial reporting, during the period examined. Therefore, the 
suggestions for regulatory/supervisory reform would be to strengthen the accounting disclosure 
rules to improve the accounting quality of bank financial reporting in Europe. Finally, future 
research could examine other earnings management techniques that banks may revert to when 
stringent disclosure regulation limits the use of bank loan loss provisions to smooth income. 
Future research can also examine whether the presence of strong institutions in Europe such as 
strong investor protection, played a significant role in limiting bank’s ability to smooth income 
during the IAS 39 re-classification period. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary of Descriptive statistics 
 Full Sample (2005-2013) Pre-IAS 39 (2005-2007) Post-IAS 39 (2009-2013) 
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
LLP 0.36 0.23 0.49 0.18 0.14 0.24 0.45 0.29 0.57 
EBTP 0.79 0.78 0.76 1.05 1.06 0.59 0.73 0.71 0.79 
LOAN 6.36 4.92 16.33 15.01 13.99 14.29 1.38 1.34 14.42 
NPL 4.26 3.03 4.29 2.34 1.67 2.06 5.31 4.17 4.81 
CAR 10.75 9.9 4.39 8.54 8.09 1.78 12.04 11.18 4.91 
SIZE 18.67 18.97 1.76 18.53 18.77 1.80 18.69 18.99 1.74 
ΔGDP 0.60 1.10 2.49 2.64 2.60 0.98 -0.15 0.50 2.66 
*SD denotes ‘Standard Deviation’. The sample comprises of 912 bank year observations for 114 
banks from 2005 to 2013. All values, except SIZE, are taken in percentages for expositional 
convenience. LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. NPL= ratio of impaired loans to 
outstanding gross loans. LOAN = change in outstanding gross loan. CAR = ratio of actual Tier 1 
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. EBTP = ratio of earnings before taxes and loan loss 
provisions to total assets. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
Variables LLP NPL LOAN EBTP CAR SIZE 
NPL 0.576*** 
(0.000) 
     
LOAN -0.106*** 
(0.004) 
-0.173*** 
(0.000) 
    
EBTP -0.042 
(0.255) 
0.013 
(0.716) 
0.246*** 
(0.000) 
   
CAR -0.223*** 
(0.000) 
-0.115*** 
(0.002) 
-0.246*** 
(0.000) 
-0.065* 
(0.076) 
  
SIZE -0.029 
(0.426) 
-0.008 
(0.831) 
-0.039 
(0.276) 
-0.199*** 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.372) 
 
ΔGDP -0.387*** 
(0.000) 
-0.276*** 
(0.000) 
0.143*** 
(0.000) 
0.069* 
(0.056) 
0.085** 
(0.020) 
0.048 
(0.193) 
Pearson correlation coefficients are reported in the table and the associated p-values are 
reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. NPL= ratio of impaired 
loans to outstanding gross loans. LOAN = change in outstanding gross loan. CAR = ratio of 
actual Tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. EBTP = ratio of earnings before 
taxes and loan loss provisions to total assets. ΔGDP = change in real gross domestic 
product. SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset 
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Table 3: Main Regression (2005-2013) 
Variable Expected 
sign 
Coefficient t-statistics p-values 
C ? 0.541 0.57 0.570 
EBTP + -0.065* -1.91 0.056 
IAS*EBTP + -0.177*** -4.93 0.000 
IAS +/- 0.241*** 5.49 0.000 
NPL + 0.044*** 8.62 0.000 
LOAN +/- -0.001 -0.97 0.331 
CAR - -0.021*** -4.99 0.000 
SIZE +/- -0.006 -0.12 0.907 
ΔGDP - -0.046*** -8.13 0.000 
     
Bank Fixed Effect  Yes   
Adjusted R²  60.86   
F-statistic  
(p-value) 
 11.74*** 
(0.000) 
  
D.W statistic  1.83   
No. of observations  747   
Sample period include 2008-year observation. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance level (based on two-tailed 
tests) at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. LLP = ratio of loan loss 
provisions to total assets. NPL= ratio of impaired loans to outstanding 
gross loans. LOAN = change in outstanding gross loan. CAR = ratio of 
actual Tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. EBTP = ratio of 
earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to total assets. ΔGDP = 
change in real gross domestic product. IAS = dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 for the post-IAS 39 reclassification period and zero otherwise. 
IAS*EBTP = the interaction of IAS with EBTP reflects whether income 
smoothing is more pronounced in the post-IAS 39 reclassification period. 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
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Table 4: Banks vs non-banks (sub-sample regression)  
Variable  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Bank Category  Listed Banks Non-listed Banks  Banks  Non-Banks  
 Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
C ? 0.488 
(0.55) 
1.179 
(0.09) 
1.595 
(1.29) 
-1.262 
(-0.48) 
EBTP + 0.087 
(0.87) 
-0.322*** 
(-5.23) 
-0.297*** 
(-4.66) 
-0.199** 
(-2.24) 
IAS*EBTP + -0.065 
(-0.58) 
0.097 
(1.61) 
0.037 
(0.59) 
0.153* 
(1.74) 
IAS +/- 0.195 
(0.71) 
-0.072 
(-0.93) 
-0.059 
(-0.76) 
0.006 
(0.04) 
NPL + 0.0.75*** 
(3.97) 
0.044*** 
(7.16) 
0.055*** 
(8.43) 
0.019* 
(1.83) 
LOAN +/- 0.0002 
(0.17) 
-0.002 
(-1.47) 
-0.001 
(-1.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
CAR - -0.055** 
(-2.59) 
-0.017*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.019 
(-1.56) 
SIZE +/- 0.006 
(0.13) 
-0.028 
(-0.40) 
-0.052 
(-0.79) 
0.098 
(0.69) 
ΔGDP - -0.028** 
-2.06 
-0.041*** 
(-5.39) 
-0.037*** 
(-5.44) 
-0.034** 
(-2.57) 
Bank Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R²  62.42 61.22 68.54 53.06 
F-statistic (p-value)  8.12*** 
(0.000) 
10.27*** 
(0.000) 
10.87*** 
(0.000) 
6.29*** 
(0.000) 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic 
 2.14 2.25 2.09 1.86 
No. of observations  86 524 540 118 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance level (based on two-tailed tests) 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. NPL= ratio of 
impaired loans to outstanding gross loans. LOAN = change in outstanding gross loan. CAR = ratio of 
actual Tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. EBTP = ratio of earnings before taxes and loan 
loss provisions to total assets. ΔGDP = change in real gross domestic product. IAS = dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for the post-IAS 39 reclassification period and zero otherwise. IAS*EBTP = the 
interaction of IAS with EBTP reflects whether income smoothing is more pronounced in the post-IAS 
39 reclassification period. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
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Table 5: Robustness Regression Statistics 
Variable  (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
C ? 0.396 
(0.36) 
0.395 
(0.32) 
0.934 
(0.90) 
2.175 
(1.14) 
EBTP + -0.049 
(-1.17) 
0.003 
(0.04) 
-0.263*** 
(-9.21) 
-0.238*** 
(-8.34) 
IAS*EBTP +    -0.196*** 
(-4.56) 
IAS +/-    0.256*** 
(4.74) 
NPL + 0.047*** 
(8.21) 
0.032* 
(1.73) 
0.029*** 
(3.98) 
0.036*** 
(5.08) 
LOAN +/- -0.0003 
(-0.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 
0.002* 
(1.74) 
0.0003 
(0.19) 
CAR 
- 
-0.024*** 
(-5.03) 
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
-0.018*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.016** 
(-2.14) 
SIZE +/- 0.002 
(0.04) 
-0.014 
(-0.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.083 
(-0.82) 
ΔGDP 
- 
-0.048*** 
(-7.75) 
0.006 
(0.2) 
-0.069*** 
(-5.45) 
-0.035*** 
(-4.92) 
Bank Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R²  62 55.78 70.52 62.71 
F-statistic (p-value)  10.74*** 
(0.000) 
3.69*** 
(0.000) 
9.21*** 
(0.000) 
8.36*** 
(0.000) 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic 
 2.04 2.35 2.92 2.27 
No. of observations  658 193 375 465 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance level (based on two-tailed 
tests) at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. LLP = ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. NPL= 
ratio of impaired loans to outstanding gross loans. LOAN = change in outstanding gross loan. CAR = 
ratio of actual Tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. EBTP = ratio of earnings before taxes 
and loan loss provisions to total assets. ΔGDP = change in real gross domestic product. IAS = dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for the post-IAS 39 reclassification period and zero otherwise. IAS*EBTP 
= the interaction of IAS with EBTP reflects whether income smoothing is more pronounced in the post-
IAS 39 reclassification period. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
